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ABSTRACT

This thesis analyzes the impact of the Evangelical movement on politics in Latin America,
through case studies on of revolutionary leftist Hugo Chávez in Venezuela and far right Jair
Bolsonaro in Brazil. Both the Chávez and Bolsonaro political machineries reached out to the
Evangelical movement and aligned themselves with new social and political actors associated
with this movement. Though these two leaders promised very different programs, they both
successfully sought the support of leaders and members of the Evangelical movement. The
contradictory context of these two cases in terms of political platforms, their shared association
with the Evangelical church, generates a puzzle of similar religious organizations supporting
vastly dissimilar political movements. This thesis uses a process tracing methodology to address
this puzzling alignment of conservative religious organizations with both ultra conservative and
revolutionary leftist political parties in the two countries.
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INTRODUCTION
In October of 2018, Jair Bolsonaro was elected president of Brazil. This election was
extremely controversial: Bolsonaro was labeled as the “Tropical Trump” of Brazil because of his
bigoted speech towards minority communities in Brazil, particularly the LGBTQ+ community,
as well as his consistent attacks on the country’s democratic institutions (Muggah, 2021). While
his rhetoric is greatly reminiscent of former US president Donald Trump, Bolsonaro is largely
characterized by one defining attribute: his purported religiosity. Bolsonaro campaigned as an
Evangelical, ultra-conservative candidate, putting partisan conservative issues at the forefront of
his campaign, and operating under the slogan “Brazil above everything, God above everyone.”
He partnered with Evangelical megachurches, particularly the Assemblies of God coalition,
along the way; being baptized by one of the most prominent leaders of the Assembly of God and
the head of the Christian Social Party. Even though Bolsonaro still calls himself a Catholic, he
has allied himself with major Evangelical leaders and garnered enough support to win the
election. (Revista Época, 2021) Bolsonaro’s divisive campaign and close alignment with
Evangelical groups is reminiscent of Hugo Chávez’s campaign for the Venezuela presidency in
1998. Chávez, like Bolsonaro, campaigned using strong Evangelical rhetoric and sought that
support for his ultra-left authoritarian platform. From the time he left jail, Chávez would call for
Evangelicals to support his movement, MBR-200, and their goals to revolutionize Venezuela
(Smilde, 2004). His use of the media in his campaign furthered his influence in the Evangelical
sphere by broadcasting his speeches, which were filled with religious rhetoric, to the public.
Chávez’s campaign speeches quoted Bolívar, Simòn Rodriguez, and the Bible (Smilde, 2004).
His use of religion in his campaign is so prominent, a Bible quote even served as one of his most
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popular campaign slogans: El que tenga ojos, que vea, el que tenga oídos que oiga (He who has
eyes, see, and He who has ears, hear) (Smilde, 2004). His use of the Bible in his campaign as
well as his direct appeals to the Evangelical population in Venezuela are just two examples of
Chávez’s cultivating Evangelical support as an important political force and religious group.
These are two vastly different candidates in terms of ideology who both chose the Evangelical
community to cater to and align with, and both resulting in major electoral wins.
The choice to study Evangelical involvement in Latin American politics with this thesis
stemmed from an interest in religion as a political tool used in campaigns. I observed that
political candidates often used religious affiliations to connect with their respective voter bases.
It is intriguing how two candidates from opposite sides of the ideological spectrum could garner
support from the same religious demographic, particularly seeing as how Evangelicals are often
viewed as conservative (Corrales, 2018). These respectively extremist candidates aligning
themselves with the Evangelical church, a religion which promotes public displays of religiosity
and morality (Steigenga & Cleary, 2007), proved to be confounding seeing as these two
candidates ran under largely militant campaigns and their presidencies both consisted of various
human rights violations. Despite this, the Evangelical movement still associated with both
candidates and endorsed their presidencies (Rennó, 2020) (Smilde, 2004). The puzzle of why
these candidates chose to align themselves with this religious movement and why the
Evangelical movement was so keen to associate with these candidates motivates this thesis.
Although research into the impact of Catholicism and Christianity on Latin America’s
political system has produced a diverse body of scholarship, study into the influence of the
Evangelical form of Christianity is less well developed. David Smilde and Paul Freston are both
prominent scholars in research on Evangelicalism, with Smilde’s research focusing largely on
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Evangelicals in Latin America with a focus in Venezuela and how the Evangelical demographic
grew during the Chávez presidency (Smilde, 2004). Freston’s research similarly focuses on
Evangelicals in Latin America, but with a focus in Brazil and how Latin American
Pentecostalism has developed politics in the country prior to Bolsonaro’s appearance in the
Brazilian political arena (Freston, 1993). Preliminary works by researchers like Timothy
Steigenga (1994, 2007, 2002) have address the arrival of Evangelical religion in Latin America
as well as religious change throughout Latin America. Research like this provides context to the
roots of Evangelical religion and how it behaves in Latin America. This research relies mainly on
individual country case studies or in the study of Evangelical religion within the Latin American
region. This thesis expands on this research to address the extent of the influence of Evangelical
religion on politics in Latin America by using two comparative case studies to reveal the
intricacies of Latin American electoral politics and religious involvement at the electoral level.
By doing so, it is possible to answer the question of what conditions have led to Evangelical
Christianity serving as a powerful political influence in Latin America. This relies on a
qualitative analysis to address the puzzle of conservative religious organizations aligning
themselves with an ultra-conservative and a revolutionary leftist political movement in
neighboring countries.
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GAP IN LITERATURE
Extensive research has been conducted on the spread of Evangelical religion in Latin
America by researchers such as David Smilde (1997; 1998; 2004; 2005; 2007), Bryan Froehle
(1998), and Paul Freston (1993; 1998) as well as on the rise of Evangelical politicians. These
works describe how the conversion rate of Catholics to Evangelical Christianity has increased
over time (Smilde, 2005) and how this spread of Evangelical religion has impacted Latin
American communities (Bastian, 1994). However, there is not enough up to date literature on
this subject to provide a clear conclusion regarding the relationship between the Evangelical
electorate and the political success of candidates on both sides of the ideological spectrum. Much
of the literature on Evangelical religion in Latin American politics, such as Timothy Steigenga’s
The Politics of the Spirit: The Political Implications of Pentecostalized Religion in Costa Rica
and Guatemala, centers largely on single case studies and do not compare the common pattern
throughout Latin America of incorporating Evangelical leaders into government executive and
legislative institutions.
Furthermore, while much of the literature focuses on the effects of Evangelical religion
on both public and foreign policy, the literature often does not consider the socio-economic
circumstances that further aggravated Brazilian and Venezuelan society and contributed to the
incorporation of religion in Latin American politics. For example, in Ronaldo de Almeida’s work
The Broken Wave: Evangelicals and Conservatism in the Brazilian Crisis, he addresses the
impact of Evangelicals in government and how Evangelicals contributed to unrest in 2013 and
the election of Bolsonaro, however it doesn’t identify the systemic economic problems that
contributed to the fragility of Brazilian society (Saad Filho & Boito, 2016). While in many
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instances religion and politics have some overlap in policy formation but do not directly
correlate, there is reason to believe that these concepts are not as mutually exclusive as
previously detailed. Therefore, in this research, I will analyze a variety of variables that
contribute to the intersection of Evangelical religion and politics in Brazil and Venezuela to
illustrate the extent to which Evangelical religion has impacted Latin American elections and
politics.
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METHODOLOGY
This thesis is a case study using a process tracing methodology and is composed of four
parts. Part one describes the origins of Evangelical religion and in Latin America, as well as the
principles and belief system backing this Christian faith. Next, there is a section covering the
political histories of Venezuela and Brazil prior to the Chávez and Bolsonaro presidencies, which
explains the structure of their political and economic systems and its characteristics prior to these
presidencies. Understanding how the financial and political institutions of these countries work is
important to this research. It provides context as to how Evangelical religion and Evangelical
institutions have impacted political systems and help explain the circumstances which swayed
the voting behavior of Evangelicals in these respective elections. The last section explores both
Chávez and Bolsonaro’s involvement with the Evangelical movement and details the influence
of Evangelical religion in both Chávez and Bolsonaro’s presidencies.
This study focuses on the relationship between Evangelicals with the candidates in these
respective elections by analyzing various cultural and institutional variables such as the theology
of Evangelicals, the political and economic history of Venezuela and Brazil, and the electoral
tactics of the candidates in their respective elections. All sections will finally come together in a
conclusion that discusses what conditions have established Evangelical Christianity as a lucrative
and powerful political influence in Latin American politics, and after a careful analysis, a
possible explanation as to why Evangelicals serve as an important voter demographic for liberal
and conservative politicians alike.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
Definitions of Evangelicalism

To understand the history of Evangelicalism in Latin America and how this religious
subsect has affected politics throughout Latin America, a working definition for Evangelicalism
must be established. The difficulty in establishing distinctive characteristics with which to build
a definition of Evangelical Christianity is that most Christian subsects have interwoven goals and
ideologies (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, Defining Evangelicalism, 2014). The Christian faith is based
wholly on the concept of salvation and meaning found through Jesus Christ, and all Christian
subsects subscribe to this core value but differ in how they prioritize their public demonstrations
of faith (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, Defining Evangelicalism, 2014). For this thesis the word
Evangelical is used with the more general definition established during the Protestant
Reformation and serve as synonymous with the Christian descriptors Pentecostal, Protestant,
Fundamentalist, and Charismatic. This will allow for a clearer depiction of the impact globalcentric Christianity has on Latin America and how the Evangelical church defines themselves in
Brazil and Venezuela respectively.
The word Evangelical is used to describe someone who subscribes to a set of beliefs and
behaviors within Christian tradition (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, Defining Evangelicalism, 2014).
The concept of Evangelicalism originated from the core of Christian religion. It serves as a
subsect of the faith and takes core tenets of the of Christian faith – salvation and meaning found
through Jesus Christ (Lewis, 2004). However, Evangelicalism focuses more on the public
dissemination of the faith through proselytizing. The word Evangelical itself is defined by the
“teaching of the gospel of the Christian religion.” (Merritt, 2015). It is derived from the Greek
9

word euangelion meaning “gospel” or “good news” and is used as a descriptor throughout the
Christian Bible when referring to the gospel of Jesus Christ (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, Defining
Evangelicalism, 2014). This definition is reflected in the goals of Evangelicals, who largely
center their faith around the concept of sharing the Christian gospel. Evangelicals link salvation
closely with ethics, focusing largely on the “…domain of rational, free and moral personhood…”
(Miller, 1989, p. 7). At its core, Evangelicalism is globally focused, centering around a
missionary view of religion in which the main goal is to disseminate the gospel globally (Lewis,
2004). During the 16th century, the word Evangelical was used during the Protestant Reformation
to describe Christians who rebelled against the Church of Rome and sought reform, leading to
the descriptor Evangelical to be synonymous with protestant (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, Defining
Evangelicalism, 2014). A challenge faced in researching Evangelicalism is its synonymity with
various Christian descriptors such as Protestantism, charismatics, fundamentalism,
Pentecostalism, etc. (Smilde, 2004). It is for this reason that Evangelicalism falls under various
definitions dependent on the regional context in which it is being discussed. While more
definitive descriptors do well in describing the progression of the Western church,
Evangelicalism did not arrive to Latin America until after the establishment of the American
Christian church. In the next section I detail the origins of Evangelicalism in Latin America.

Origins of Evangelical Religion in Latin America

The direct origins of Protestantism throughout Latin America are difficult to trace largely
due to how the religion has developed differently across the region. However, the root of
modern-day Evangelicals stems from United States’ missionaries who introduced Pentecostal
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religion to the region in the early 20th century (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, 2014, pp. 17-22). Over
time Pentecostalism in Latin America has taken on its own form and evolved from the American
and Euro-centric practices of the religion (Freston, 2004).
To understand the evolution of Evangelicalism in Latin America, it is important to
understand both the theology of Evangelicalism and its genealogy. The doctrine igniting the
establishment of Evangelicals in the United States as a prominent subsect of Christianity was
initiated by the holiness movement in the West during the 1900s which called for baptism to be a
public demonstration indicative of salvation (Lewis, Pierard, & Noll, 2014, pp. 20-23). After
Evangelicalism had become established in the United States, its arrival in Latin America was
largely facilitated by American missionaries with ties to the Western church and immigrants
living in the US who remained in contact with their families in Latin America (Freston, 1998).
There is great difficulty in being able to track the route of the spread of Pentecostalism in Latin
America due to the lack of academic histories of large churches. From what is known of its
arrival, we can pinpoint the earliest signs of Pentecostalism in Brazil in a small city by the
Amazon with the arrival of two missionaries (Alencar, 2012). Outside of Pentecostalism in
Brazil, the genealogy of this religion is largely unknown. The lack of information on these
churches is in part due to the nature of the religion which the church is built on and its theology.
Pentecostalism is rooted in the spread of the gospel and as a result Pentecostal churches
are constantly evolving and shifting, making them difficult to track (Smilde, 2004). Paul Freston
(1998) calls Pentecostalism in Latin America “…mass lower-class Protestantism” which expands
on Catholic and Lutheran doctrine and thus caters to a wider range of people. Similarly,
Evangelicals in Latin America have organized themselves in conversionist sects (Freston, 1998)
and thus has different variations of the religion per sect. The popularity of Pentecostalism in
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various social classes comes from the diversity of its theology and the potential for mobility
within the religion (Smilde, 2005, p. 761). Pentecostal churches create their own social order
within their church which allows for Pentecostal leaders to be elevated to a higher social stance
in their community (Smilde, 2005). This social order and the benefits associated with respecting
this order lays the groundwork for a strong sense of community within the religion. This strong
sense of loyalty and belonging is what makes the Pentecostal church so unified. Latin American
Evangelicals are more enthusiastic and less fundamentalist than their North American
counterparts and define themselves by their attempt to revert to the religiosity of the primitive
churches established in the Epistles of Paul (Smilde, 1997). Evangelical religion focuses largely
on the polarizing concepts of good and bad: with the Holy Trinity on one end and the Devil on
the other end of the spectrum, with each entity acting within the universe and influencing actions
on earth. Evangelical religion dictates you should not be “of the world” but instead “filled with
the spirit,” striving for perfection and piety (Lewis, 2004). As a result of this, Evangelicals are
externally motivated to share the spirit and evangelize to non-believers, however their core
community remains closed within other Evangelicals. The loyalty that members of the religion
have towards their community and its religious leaders contributes to its prominence in Latin
American societies, bleeding into Latin American culture and politics.
According to the World Christian Database, when Pentecostalism found its way into Latin
America in the 1900s it accounted for less than .01% of the Latin American population. Since
then that number has grown, with Pentecostals in Latin America being estimated to number 30 –
35 million, two thirds of the Protestant population (Freston, 1998); and has grown since then,
with 19.5% of respondents associating with the religion, according to a 2018 poll (Romero,

12

2021). The rapid growth of Evangelicals in Latin America also explains why voters identifying
as Evangelicals continues to grow.

Venezuelan Politics Prior to Chávez

Like Brazil and much of Latin America, Venezuela operates under a mix of different
electoral systems. The national executive branch is elected by plurality for a six-year term, with
the president having no limit on reelection (Republica Bolivariana de Venezuela (Bolivarian
Republic of Venezuela), n.d.). The state and provincial executive leaders are also elected by
plurality for a four-year term. However, they can only be reelected for one extra term and only
have political autonomy over the states and provinces they govern. Power remains centralized
with the federal government, as they still control state taxes, electoral processes, and all
government institutions. The unicameral Venezuelan National Assembly uses a proportional
representation system to elect the 51 members of the National Assembly are elected from party
lists. The 23 states each elect two or three members of parliament determined by population in
the areas (circuitos electorales). In 2020, the National Electoral Council announced an increase
of 110 seats, with 277 National Assembly seats elected. 144 seats were chosen by party lists and
allocated using the D’Hondt method, and the remaining 133 seats were elected by first-past-thepost-voting (Walker, 2021). Currently the National Assembly has been dominated largely by two
parties – the United Socialist Party of Venezuela (PSUV) and the Fifth Republic Movement
(MVR) (Gunson, 2015). The nature of the Venezuelan electoral structure is significant in
understanding how the two political parties dominating the multi-party electoral system further
aggravated a sense of political inequality within the public.
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Venezuela’s party system was largely centralized and consolidated. From 1968 to 1993,
Venezuela operated under an almost absolute two-party hegemony distinguished by state
intervention in the economy and partisan control of the bureaucracy. The two major parties,
Democratic Action (AD) and Committee of Independent Electoral Political Organization
(COPEI) also known as the Christian Democrats, were the most well-funded and highly
supported parties in Venezuela, garnering most of electorate’s votes for years (Buxton, 2005).
The transition from dictatorship to electoral democracy in 1961 was focused on the
consolidation of a political system which centralized access to political power and the benefits of
the country’s oil revenues during it (BBC, 2019). Venezuela’s economy has been largely
centered on oil since Juan Vicente Gómez served as the interim leader in 1908, during which oil
was first discovered in Maracaibo in 1922 and Venezuela became one of the world’s largest oil
exporters (Cheatham & Labrador, 2021). This lucrative resource allowed him to invest in public
works and bribe officials to legitimize his regime and improve the Venezuelan economy (Seelke,
Nelson, Margesson, & Brown, 2021). The discovery of oil in Venezuela in 1922 also marked the
start of American imperialism in the country, as America began to establish economic relations
during Gomez’s reign in search of this lucrative resource (Cheatham & Labrador, 2021).
Following Gómez’s death, authoritarianism returned to Venezuela and with it the creation of
AD, one of Venezuela’s oldest political parties. AD’s establishment is significant to the
country’s history as it was the political party which facilitated a coup in 1945 lead by Pérez
Jimenez. This new government established the trienio adeco, which roughly translates to the
three-year period of the Adecos; Adecos being members of Democratic Action, a Venezuelan
political party (Buxton, 2005). This electoral policy permitted universal adult voting for the first
time and ushered in the first peaceful transfer of power in Venezuela’s history with its first
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universal free and fair elections. The trienio adeco symbolizes the first signs of democracy in
Venezuela, however it did not las long.
A longer period of stability began in 1958 after the overthrow of Marco Pérez Jiménez.
With this removal came the establishment of the Puntofijo agreement, in which the AD, COPEI,
and the Democratic Republican Union (URD) signed a pact stating that the three parties would
share power regardless of which party won the 1959 elections (McCoy, 2000). The Puntofijo
agreement was born out of an attempt to combat authoritarianism and unilateral governments
like the Pérez Jiménez dictatorship. It was concentrated alliances and tactic cooperation between
the three parties to sustain stable democracy through unified party leadership, recognition of free
and fair election results, and the distribution and sharing of oil wealth (McCoy, 2000). However,
this pact also led to the parties taking control of most civil and financial institutions throughout
the country as they relied on oil revenues to meet the needs of their constituencies. Over time,
what once was a coalition set to stabilize democracy became a centralized government benefiting
from the riches of the oil economy. Oil being the main source of economic stability for
Venezuela had led to an increased dependence on oil prices on all fronts. Throughout the 1970s
and early 1980s Venezuela had experienced extreme economic growth and political stability
because of the oil economy. After the establishment of OPEC, the country served as the model
for Latin American politics and economy, with a seemingly ‘stable’ government and an increase
in state revenue due to the oil boom (Strønen I. Å., 2017). As shown in Figure 1, Venezuela had
the highest GDP per capita in Latin America, making it an extremely popular migration
destination for immigrants seeking opportunity. The oil economy had brought socio-economic
stability through its well distributed wealth.
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Figure 1 - GDP Based on PPP Per Capita (1982)
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However, when oil prices crashed in the 1980s, Venezuela’s stable political economy crumbled
(López Maya, 2003). The government under Puntofijo implemented austerity measures,
increased taxes, and increased fuel prices through structural adjustment packages established by
President Perez during his second term as president (Bruce, 2008). These measures led to what
is known as the Caracazo in Caracas, a series of riots as a response to these structural adjustment
packages and public frustration with the centralized government in place (López Maya, 2003).
The economic distress throughout Venezuela, the high level of centralization of executive and
legislative power, and corruption throughout the political system became a gaping issue for the
country (López Maya, 2003). This mass distrust of government within the population and
widespread instability in Venezuela’s political and economic systems left room for Chávez’s
anti-corruption platform to succeed in the 1998 election (López Maya, 2003).
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Chávez, a leftist political candidate who became an authoritarian president, ran on an antiestablishment platform which was reinforced by his militant background. Chávez was radicalized
in the military following the Venezuelan government’s response to the Caracazo and organized
the 1992 coup against former President Carlos Andrés Pérez (Strønen I. Å., 2016). He surrendered,
was tried, and sentenced to two years in jail because of this failed coup. His opposition to Perez’s
economic policy developments helped create his Movimiento Bolivariano Revolucionario (MBR200) which served as his political platform when he ran for election (Smilde, 2004).
Table 1 illustrates the outcome of the Chávez election and how Evangelicals voted in this
election. While the difference seems minute, when looking at the absolute numbers it is visible
that Evangelicals rallied around Chávez in this election.

Table 1 - Voting Tendency by Religious Affiliation (1989 Election)

Non-Evangelical

Evangelical

Sáez

13.3%

11.4%

Chávez

40.6%

41.4%

Salas

19.3%

16.1%

Fermín

3.5%

5.7%

Alfaro

4.2%

3.4%

10.3%

12.6%

7.0%

5.7%

Undecided
Not going to vote
Source: Smilde, Contradiction Without Paradox, 2002

17

Brazilian Politics Prior to Bolsonaro

The Brazilian electoral system, like many Latin American countries, has a mix of
representational formulas used to elect different levels of government. Most executive offices,
including presidents and governors, are elected by an absolute majority vote through a two-round
system. There is a runoff between the two top candidates if no candidate obtains 50% of the vote
in the first round. As per a 1997 election, presidents in Brazil are now allowed to run for reelection once. Outside of this amendment, legislative elections in Brazil have remained largely
unchanged since their establishment in 1946 (Ace Project: The Electoral Knowledge Network,
n.d.). For lower-level offices, such as mayors with less than 200,000 voters, the elections are
usually conducted in a single round, plurality format. In locally concentrated elections, such as
federal and state deputies or town council representatives, candidates are elected using a
proportional election rule. Brazil’s use of all three major electoral systems (absolute majority,
plurality, and proportional elections) reflects a diverse political landscape in the country. Brazil
also enforces compulsory voting which requires all literate citizens between 18 and 70 years old,
including those who live abroad, to vote or pay a penalty. However, studies have shown that
compulsory voting in Brazil is not increasingly effective nor does it promote informed voting
(Freire & Turgeon, 2020).
The biggest controversy in terms of electoral laws is the election process for the Chamber
of Deputies, the legislative body for the lower level of Congress in Brazil. The Chamber has 513
members who are elected through 27 multi-member electoral districts in an open-list PR system.
This system allows for voters to cast their vote for either a political party or an individual
candidate. Votes for candidates from each party are calculated using the D’Hondt Formula to
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give a total party vote which then determines what parties meet the vote quota and how many
seats will be allocated to those parties that reach the threshold for representation (Rennó, 2020).
The candidates with the most votes in each party receive one of the seats that are allocated to that
party. This form of voting encourages competition between political parties and within the
parties as candidates compete against each other for one of the seats allocated to their party.
There is also the issue of personalism within the electorate. If voters have a greater attachment to
the individual candidate over the party, voters could be more likely to remain loyal and vote for
that same candidate even if they were to switch parties (Nicolau, 2007). The tie between voters
and their representatives leaves room for party fragmentation and greater difficulty in pushing
forth legislation (Nicolau, 2007). The main controversy in this form of election is that the range
on the size of electoral districts leaves for largely disproportional representation in the Chamber
in terms of population. The larger the district, the higher the threshold of voters necessary to
elect one representative. This malapportionment benefits states with a smaller population, which
tend to be the more rural, poor, and agriculturally focused (Antonopolous, França Ribeiro, &
Cottle, 2020). As I will discuss later in this thesis, the rural and less affluent regions of Brazil are
also the focus of the spread of Evangelicalism within the country, and thus these votes are often
influenced by Evangelical ideology. The connection between the areas of Brazil which hold
larger representation in Congress and the spread of Evangelical influence on Brazilian politics is
notable and influential in the context of this thesis.
Prior to Jair Bolsonaro’s election, Brazil’s electoral history since the return of democracy
in the 1990s was largely stable and predictable. The left-leaning Worker’s Party (PT) or the
center-right Party of Brazilian Social Democracy (PSDB) usually won with between 70 to 90
percent of all votes cast (Hunter & Power, 2019). The three presidents elected – Fernando
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Henrique Cardoso (1995-2003) of the PDSB, Lula da Silva (2003-2011), and Dilma Rousseff
(2011-2016) who from the PT – all had successful elections and reelections. The success of the
PT and PSDB in legislative elections is similar, particularly because the closer presidential
elections are to legislative elections, the stronger the coattails effect is and thus the presidential
elections carry a large influence on the legislative elections (Samuels D. J., 2000). These
electoral successes would normally indicate stability in party politics and consistency within the
party system, however the controversy that surrounded these presidencies led to the public’s
distrust of the established parties (Saad Filho & Boito, 2016). Bolsonaro was elected on the heels
of major political scandal and political instability. Former President Dilma Rousseff’s
impeachment in 2015; the Lava-Jato operation, which exposed bribes to Vice President Michel
Temer and Aécio Neves (PSDB) from a major food industry giant in Brazil; and the Workers
Party’s (PT) support of Lula Da Silva as a candidate despite his incarceration (Rennó, 2020).
Lula da Silva’s campaign promised to maintain fiscal stability and promote economic growth,
and during the beginning of his presidency he held up that promise. His first two years saw
economic growth and lower unemployment by building on Fernando Cardoso’s policies,
particularly the Bolsa Familia Program (Goertzel, 2006). He was known as one of Brazil’s
favorite presidents because of the financial relief he brought the country The Lava Jato
corruption scandal, known as Operation Car Wash in English, changed Lula’s presidency.
Petrobras, Brazil’s national oil company, had bribed its top-level officials by Odebrecht SA and
other Brazilian construction firms to ensure that they were awarded inflated contracts (Goertzel,
2006). Many politicians also received kickbacks in the form of campaign donations. This
corruption scandal was not unique to Brazil and it implicated politicians and influential people
throughout Latin America and globally through the Olympics scandal because of a Brazilian
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company. One of the politicians implicated in this scandal was Lula Da Silva, being sent to
prison for his involvement in the scandal (Lagunes & Svejnar, 2020).
Corruption was rampant in the years prior to Bolsonaro’s election, and this corruption left
voters with a great desire for change (Polimédio, 2019). The PT was blamed for the economic
downturn after 2013, the entirety of the Lava-Jato crisis, and increased crime throughout Brazil
because of the economic instability (Goertzel, 2006). The shifting political landscape and
economic corruption engrained in policies created by the Dilma administration caused upset
within the public (Polimédio, 2019). Figure 2 illustrates the negative GDP growth created during
the Dilma/Temer administration, with a steep drop shown during the years of the Lava-Jato case.
The rampant corruption pertinent in this administration throughout the scandal took a toll on
GDP growth in the country, increasing unemployment as the country hemorrhaged funds
because of the money laundering occurring in the scandal (Goertzel, 2006). This economic
uncertainty as well as political stress amid the 2018 elections could be an explanation for
Bolsonaro’s success in running for office in contrast to his unsuccessful candidacy in 2015.
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Figure 2 - Brazilian GDP Growth, 2003-2019 (%)
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Despite these sensitive political and economic circumstances, Lula was still the prime
candidate for the presidency. His association with the PT did not impact his increased popularity
as a candidate. However, he was disqualified at the end of August 2018 after being convicted for
corruption. His conviction left an open opportunity for Bolsonaro to create a concrete and
convincing campaign that preached change from the corrupt presidencies of the past.
Bolsonaro’s 2018 electoral win, as discussed later in this thesis, is supported by a strong
Evangelical voter base that develops because of these circumstances.
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ANALYSIS
Venezuela
Evangelicals account for a mere 5% of Venezuela’s population as of 2005 and the voter
base within the religion is surprisingly diverse and unpredictable despite the conservative beliefs
of Evangelicals (Smilde, 2004). David Smilde argues that Pentecostals traditionally oppose leftwing revolutionary politicians, instead favoring pluralist political contexts which would allow
them to be able to practice religion more openly and with less political restriction. While
normally this would be an obstacle for Chávez’s campaign because of its revolutionary nature,
he benefitted from the support of Evangelicals because of his engagement with its religious
leaders (Smilde, 2007). His appeal to Pentecostals despite his leftist campaign spurs largely from
his religious discourse and choice to engage religious leaders and organizations to fortify his
political movement and transition it from an almost exclusively militant movement to one
backed by civilians and the everyday voter (Smilde, 2007). The Evangelical Council of
Venezuela took particular interest in Chávez during the beginnings of his presidency. Up until
Chávez’s expulsion of the New Tribes mission from Venezuela in 2005, the council even
participated in and actively endorsed some of Chávez’s policies. This council is one of the larger
organizations which represents Evangelicals in Venezuela, so their initial support is significant in
highlighting part of how Evangelical support was rallied in favor of Chávez. Evangelical
comparative voting preferences data for the 1998 election in Venezuela illustrates that 41.4% of
Evangelicals voted for Chávez, while 40.6% of non-Evangelicals voted for him (Smilde, 2004).
Part of the reason why Chávez appealed to Pentecostals is based on the demographic of
Pentecostals in Venezuela. Evangelical protestants follow closely with the class structure of
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Venezuela (Smilde, 2004). Evangelical protestants have a higher concentration in lower class
and marginalized groups in Venezuela. In his research, Smilde (2004) highlights the voter
behavior for the election of Chávez and shows that support for Chávez was highest among lower
income and more marginalized groups in Venezuela. The correlation between Evangelical
attitudes being most prominent among marginalized groups and the marginalized groups polling
highest in support for Chávez illustrate in part the impact of mobilization of Pentecostal believers
on the election of Chávez in Venezuela.
Although Chávez did not explicitly identify himself as Evangelical or Protestant, his
continuous engagement with the Evangelical movement and prioritization of Evangelical values
left room for voters who would traditionally avoid voting for a left candidate to support Chávez
(Smilde, 2004). Smilde’s research shows that Evangelicals were even willing to overlook
Chávez’s violent actions because of the religious dialogue he was engaging in. Many saw him as
a “converted militant” and were drawn to him because “Putting aside the violent part… his ideas
are right on track.” (Smilde, 2004). The Evangelical population benefitted from Chávez’s
candidacy despite his lack of morality because of his openness in engaging in Evangelical issues
and championing Evangelical causes – even if the support was created to combat the Catholic
majority. Chávez’s political movement chose to establish a base among Evangelicals because of
their growth and progressive orientation which helped establish the religion as an emergent
social and political force.
After his election Chávez continued to engage in protecting Evangelical interests and
making policy decisions which limited the Catholic church and benefitted the Evangelical
movement. It could be argued that Chávez was aware of the importance of the Evangelical vote
and maintained his religious dialogue to maintain Evangelical support which kept him afloat.
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Part of the reason why Chávez appealed to Pentecostals is based on the demographic of
Pentecostals in Venezuela. Evangelical Protestants associate more with the lower class and
marginalized groups in Venezuela (Smilde, 2004). Based on the voter behavior for the 1989
election, support for Chávez was highest among the lower income and more marginalized groups
in Venezuela. The correlation between Evangelical attitudes being most prominent among
marginalized groups and the marginalized groups polling highest in support for Chávez illustrate
in part the weight that Evangelical religion holds on electoral politics. Not only is there a high
concentration of Evangelicals in lower income communities in Venezuela, but this community
was also the most financially impacted by the Caracazo and the oil crash (Cheatham &
Labrador, 2021). The increased taxes and austerity measures made it nearly impossible for lower
income citizens to survive. Resources were scarce, and the removal and lack of maintenance on
the public works programs established during the golden age of Venezuela greatly impacted the
quality of life of lower income citizens. Evangelical religion catered to this struggle, through the
preaching of the prosperity gospel.
Chávez geared his campaign towards Evangelicals not just because they themselves were
a major influential power, but because the Catholic church was openly opposing his plans and
policies (Froehle, 1998). By targeting the Evangelical population, Chávez was able to utilize an
already rapidly growing demographic to combat the opposition of the Catholic church. He was
able to garner Evangelical support and provide them with an opportunity to gain prominence in
government through his preferential treatment towards this religious group. Jean Pierre Bastian
(1994) argues that while many new political actors in Latin America court Evangelicals in the
beginning of their campaigns, this outreach is usually abandoned after the candidate achieves
power. However, in the case of Chávez, Evangelical outreach continued throughout his time in
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power, largely due to unilateral actions created to weaken the Catholic church and their political
influence. Some of these actions included Roman Delgado, a lawyer and known Evangelical
sympathizer, being chosen to run the Directorate of Religion in the Ministry of Justice (Smilde,
1999). Roman had represented Evangelicals before the Directorate before, and now that he served
as the head of the Directorate, which oversees religious practice, he was able to minimize the
conflict Evangelicals have had in the past with this legislative body because of Catholic influence
(Smilde, 1999). This, along with legislation that permitted Evangelicals to teach religion in public
schools and Chávez’s cut of part of the subsidy given to the Catholic Church as an indirect response
to their pushback of Evangelical-geared policies, illustrated the extent to which Chávez was
willing to collaborate with Evangelicals to minimize the reach of the Catholic Church in legislation
(Smilde, 1999). The Catholic church remained a prominent force politically through their
associations with political parties such as the Christian Democratic Party. Venezuela has had very
few political parties associated with Evangelicals, the most prominent being the Organización
Renovadora Auténtica (ORA). ORA won seats in Congress throughout numerous elections;
however, when the founder of the party associated himself with corrupt leaders through the ADORA pact, the party disbanded and left Evangelicals with no real political platform on which to
rely on in government (Smilde, 2004).
Chávez choosing to cater to the Evangelical voter base by engaging in dialogue with the
church allowed him to gain support from a rapidly growing religious organization while pushing
back against Catholic criticism and limiting their extensive political reach (Froehle, 1998). This is
not to say that Chávez alienated Chávez also catered to the Evangelical and conservative
population by appointing conservative and center-right candidates to economic posts and engaging
in Pentecostal dialogue (Smilde, 2005). Evangelicals account for a mere 5% of Venezuela’s
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population as of 2005; however, from 1967 to 1980, the Evangelical population increased from
47,000 to 500,000 (Cleary & Stewart-Gambino, 1998). The Evangelical voter base is diverse and
unpredictable in terms of political alignment as it does not always lean towards a particular
political party because the religions’ theology is quite flexible and not consistent per each
denomination, as discussed in this thesis (Smilde, 2005). Chávez also faced critiques from
Evangelicals for his totalitarian tendencies and violent attempts to take power in Venezuela
(Smilde, 2004). These two factors bring into question why Evangelicals would support Chávez in
his presidential campaign that is often counterintuitive to religious ideology. Chávez’s
authoritarian political history is not one that is objectively “moral” by religious standards. Even in
his early beginnings, the Chávez’s campaign sought to concentrate power by any means, including
his neglect of human rights. Evangelicals who were hesitant about Chávez’s candidacy had worries
rooted in his violent past, particularly his involvement in the February 1992 coup attempt. This,
along with his totalitarian tendencies in his search for power made many Evangelicals concerned
about his candidacy (Smilde, 2005). These concerns were overturned for many by the campaign
structure of Chávez, which focused on using mass media to engage voters. Chávez’s speeches
mixed revolutionary writings such as the words of Simón Bolívar with Venezuelan literature, and
Biblical rhetoric. This allowed for him to appeal to a range of voters and appease the Evangelical
population of Venezuela. His religious rhetoric appealed to Evangelicals, making many feel as
though Chávez was reformed from his violent past and was engaging in “spiritual communion” by
citing the Bible and therefore “honoring God” through his campaign (Smilde, 2005). Chávez’s
political party MBR-200 served as the primary vehicle in which he engaged with the Evangelical
electorate. According to David Smilde,
“From the time he left jail and began public appearances as leader of the MBR-
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200, as well as throughout the campaign, Chávez mentioned Evangelicals whenever he
mentioned emergent actors in civil society working for change.” (Smilde, 2004)
Chávez engaged with the Evangelical population for support to revolutionize Venezuela and called
on the religious group as a crucial part of his newly founded political base. Chávez even went as
far as to use a verse from the bible as his campaign slogan: “Let he who has eyes see, and he who
has ears, hear.” MBR-200 frequently used this biblical imagery not only as a means of engaging
with Evangelicals, but also as a tactic to reframe Chávez as a “converted militant” who had
changed from his totalitarian ways into one of democracy. While his election would prove this not
to be true, his campaign tactic of religiosity allowed for him to have pull with Evangelicals
throughout the country who were willing to overlook his violent past in favor of this his reformed
persona. His consistent engagement in religious rhetoric won over Evangelicals across Venezuela
and served as an important tool which would help him win 56% of the vote and catapult his future
six-year term as a president (Smilde, 2007).

Brazil

To understand the significance of the Evangelical church in Brazilian politics, it is
important to recognize the growth of Evangelical religion in the country. Figure 3 illustrates the
general trend in Brazil: a continuous decline of Catholicism and a rapid growth of Evangelicals.
By 2010, those who identified as non-Catholic accounted for 35.5 percent of the population.
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Figure 3 - Population Distribution According to Declared Religion (%)
100
90
80
70
60
50
40
30
20
10
0
1960

1970

Catholic/Orthodox

1960
Catholic/Orthodox 93.3
Evangelical
4
(Pentecostal and
non-Pentecostal)
Spiritism
1.3
Other
.9
No Religion
.5

1980

1991

Evangelical

Spiritism

2000
Other

2010
No Religion

1970
91.8
5.2

1980
89
6.6

1991
83.3
9

2000
73.9
15.4

2010
65
22.2

1.3
1
.8

1.3
1.2
1.9

1.6
1
5.1

1.6
1.5
7.6

2.3
2.3
8.1

Source: IBGE (Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics). Demographic Censuses, 1960–2010. Almeida

Despite the Evangelical movement showing great growth in Brazil, the dominant religion
of Brazil remains Roman Catholicism. It would seem more efficient to use them as a target voter
group because of their numbers. However, as reflected in Figure 3, the Evangelical population in
Brazil grew significantly from 1960 to 2010. This growth is at a rate that is on par with if not
higher than that of the Catholic population. Evangelical protestants have been identified as the
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fastest growing religious demographic in the country (Censo, 2010) with as many as 40 new
Evangelical churches opening weekly in Rio De Janeiro beginning in 2000 (Antonopolous,
França Ribeiro, & Cottle, 2020). While Catholicism still held a majority as of 2000, the rapid
growth rate of the Evangelical church illustrates a possible challenge to the prominence of
Catholicism in the country. While 48% of Evangelicals had no other religion in their lifetime
44% of Evangelicals polled said they were once Catholic before their conversion (Datafolha
2016). This could be an explanation for the decline of the Catholicism, as many have since
converted to Protestant churches in Brazil. If current trends are maintained, Catholics are
projected to account for less than 50 percent of the Brazilian population by 2022, and by 2032
are expected to be outnumbered by Evangelicals (Eustáquio Diniz Alves, n.d.).
The impact this growth has had on Brazil’s political system was illustrated in the 1986
electoral process, which led to the integration of Evangelical groups in politics with a more
active role in the democratic pact established in the 1988 constitution, switching from “Believers
don’t engage in politics,” to “Brother votes for brother.” (de Almeida, 2020). On top of the
controversial issues regarding biblical morality that Evangelical political participation is seen by
many as the outcome of the re-democratization process (de Almeida, 2020), and while there has
not been a drastic change in themes mobilizing the Evangelical vote the rapid growth of the
religion has made it more efficient and prominent which has allowed it to hold a further reach in
Brazilian politics.
The political context of Bolsonaro’s election helps shed some understanding on the
reasoning behind his partnership with the Evangelical church. Bolsonaro, who could be
identified as an ultra-conservative candidate (Antonopolous, França Ribeiro, & Cottle, 2020)
appeals mainly to conservatism because of his extreme rhetoric, criticizing the left and
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establishing an ‘us vs. them’ stance that clearly splits conservatives from the left on issues such
as gender politics or LGBTQ+ rights (Polimédio, 2019). By establishing a clear divide between
left and conservative political stances, he was able to align conservatives with an ‘anticorruption’ platform. He then used this anti-corruption stance to argue against the PT and their
endorsement for Lula Da Silva as a presidential candidate while he was imprisoned for
involvement in Lava-Jato. Figure 4 illustrates the shift in political ideological association from
2006-2018 and highlights the drastic shift towards the right in 2018.

Figure 4 - Ideological Self Placement 2006-2018 (%)
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Bolsonaro’s inclusion of biblical issues of “morality” in his political agenda, such as his
openly anti-gay platform, allowed for his campaign to articulate with an Evangelical
parliamentary base as well as with the Evangelical voter who, based on theology, concerns
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themselves with issues related to “… the body, behavior, and family ties…” (de Almeida, 2020).
Almeida describes Bolsonaro’s campaign as one that has signaled to Evangelicals through
Christianity, alienating Afro-Brazilian and Spiritualist religions, and instead melding Judaism
with traditional North American Evangelical fundamentalist tones. By doing so, Bolsonaro was
able to address the Evangelical population while also highlighting Catholic theological
similarities. This carried a lot of weight electorally, as shown in Table 2 which illustrates votes in
the 2018 election according to their religious affiliations.

Table 2 – Distribution of the Electorate by Religion (2018 Election)

Religion
Catholic

Votes for Bolsonaro
Votes for Haddad
Difference
29,795,232
29,630,786
164,446

Evangelical
Afro-Brazilian
Spiritualist
Other Religion
No Religion
Atheist and Agnostic
Total Votes

21,595,284

10,042,504

11,552,780

312,975

755,887

-442,912

1,721,363

1,457,783

263,580

709,410

345,549

363,862

3,286,239

4,157,381

-871,142

375,570

691,097

-315,527

57,796,074

47,080,987

10,715,087

Source: Datafolha Survey 2018 - Almeida

The balance in Catholic votes is surprising, as their votes were split fairly evenly despite
the slight lean towards Bolsonaro. However, it is the Evangelical vote that made the biggest
difference for Bolsonaro in terms of absolute numbers. His campaign, centered around issues of
morality and anti-Worker’s Party (PT) sentiments, not only drew the attention of Evangelicals
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but also of the general populace. The PT had held the presidency for the previous thirteen years,
from Lula da Silva in 2003 to Dilma Roussef in 2016 (Amaral, 2020). These presidencies were
all surrounded by mass controversy and corruption as mentioned earlier in this thesis, and these
presidencies left the public dissatisfied with the PT and in search of a new wave of politics
(Samuels D. J., 2000). Steering political favor away from the PT is something that benefits the
Evangelical church as well. The PT serves as the largest party in legislature (Samuels D. , 2004)
and has been the party of choice for many Brazilian presidential candidates. By electing a
candidate like Bolsonaro who pushes back against the majority legislative party and endorses
Evangelical causes, the legislative Evangelical bloc known as the Evangelical Parliamentary
Front has more of an advantage as more congressional seats may open if the PT majority shrinks.
This would benefit the Evangelical bloc in terms of political influence, seeing as the PT holds
many seats in legislature.
Bolsonaro is also politically connected to the Evangelical church in terms of media
endorsement by UCKG’s radio and tv networks (Reis, 2006). The exclusive link between
Bolsonaro and the Evangelical church is one that is mutually beneficial in terms of politics.
Through this partnership, the Evangelical church is more likely to gain legislative power and
Bolsonaro gains almost 70% of the Pentecostal vote as shown in the above table. Bolsonaro
chose to align himself politically with the Evangelical movement, particularly with the Universal
Church of the Kingdom of God. While that seems like a puzzling decision, seeing as how
Evangelicals made up only 30% of the electorate in 2015 (Spektor, 2018). However, due to the
nature of the Brazilian multi-party and two-round voting system, this alignment could be seen as
a strategic political move. By aligning himself with a rapidly growing religious group, he won
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the election and increased his possibility of reelection, as the increased membership of the
church could increase the likelihood of their voter participation.
Another puzzling decision on behalf of Bolsonaro is his choice of alignment specifically
with the UCKG. Table 3 illustrates the breakdown of major Evangelical churches in Brazil and
demonstrates the Assembly of God as the largest of those churches as of 2000. While UCKG is
not the largest of the churches, their growth rate is set at almost 26% which is the highest of the
major Pentecostal churches in Brazil.

Table 3 - Brazil Church Concentration (2008)

Chart

Assembly
of God

Christian
Congregation in
Brazil

Universal
Church of
the
Kingdom
of God

Foursquare
Gospel
Church

Pentecostal
Church God
is Love

Members

8,418,154

2,489,079

2,101,884

1,318,812

774,827

Growth
Percentage
(1991-2000)

14.8%

4.8%

25.7%

17.7%

18.4%

Source: Revista de Estudos da Religião 2008

According to Veja Magazine, UCKG membership grew by 280% in Brazil during the
first half of the 1990s and has rapidly expanded to more than 80 countries across the globe (Reis,
2006). UCKG founder Edir Macedo has played a crucial role in the expansion of the church in
Brazil, which is the largest and most influential of the church branches. Macedo is one of the
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most prominent Evangelical leaders in Latin America (Zaitchik & Lord, 2019) and has grown the
church into an empire that carries influence in various socioeconomic sectors of Brazil. UCKG
holds a 49% stake in private Brazilian bank Banco Renner and owns media organization Rede
Record, which is home to Brazil’s number two television network. These two aspects of
UCKG’s empire provide the church with great power in finance and media, the latter of which
was used in the 2018 to promote Jair Bolsonaro’s candidacy for president (Zaitchik & Lord,
2019). UCKG’s main political tool for mobilizing the Evangelical population in the 2018
election was the media, as Macedo publicly endorsed Bolsonaro on Rede’s radio station and used
RecordTV to consistently promote positive Bolsonaro news (Zaitchik & Lord, 2019).
It is important to note that all five of the churches listed are part of a powerful
Evangelical bloc in Congress known as the Evangelical Parliamentary Front, which frequently
aligns itself with the Catholic Parliamentary Front for policy formation (Polimédio, 2019). The
UCKG entered the politics in 1986 with the election of one member to Congress; by 1998, the
church has elected 26 members of Congress to State legislative assemblies in eighteen states
throughout the country and 17 federal members of Congress (Oro, 2018). Increased UCKG
representatives in the National Congress has greatly contributed to the growth of the Evangelical
Parliamentary Front, which consists of 23 Congressmen from Assembly of God, 22 from or
endorsed by UCKG, 8 Baptists, and the rest from other denominations (Oro, 2018). Although it
isn’t possible to dictate an exclusive Evangelical vote that is consistent in every scenario, the
impact of UCKG’s widespread influence throughout political and socio-economic sectors is
significant enough to attribute as impactful in Bolsonaro’s election win.
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CONCLUSION
Both Brazil and Venezuela ushered in controversial presidents (Bolsonaro and Chávez)
during times of near political collapse. Both candidates come from drastically different sides of
the ideological spectrum – with Chávez serving as a left authoritarian candidate and Bolsonaro
serving as a conservative right leaning candidate. Evangelical voters both had a significant
impact in the elections of these presidents despite not being the religious majority in each
country, as shown in the below table comparing the two.

Table 4 - Voting Tendency by Religious Affiliation, 1998 Chávez Election and
2018 Bolsonaro Election

Non-Evangelical

Evangelical

Chávez

40.6%

41.4%

Bolsonaro

49.6%

68%

Source: Datafolha Survey 2018 – Almeida; Smilde, Contradiction Without Paradox, 2002

Both candidates directly addressed and associated with this religious group during their
campaigns, and as a result benefitted either from their votes or their resources When all these
components are laid out and looked at in an overall perspective, it leads us to the question of why
this religious group serves as an important voter demographic for both liberal and conservative
politicians alike? What conditions have established Evangelical Christianity as important and
powerful political allies in Latin America? To answer this question, although it is not a simple
task, one must look at the key factors that have had direct involvement in the election of these
two presidents and how they coincided with the rise of the Evangelical church.
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To begin with, the predecessors of these presidencies had fallen into corruption, not uncommon
in many Latin American governments. As analyzed throughout this thesis, both countries had
experienced tumultuous and corrupt presidencies which led voters to question the political norms
of their respective countries. The rampant corruption within these governments and abuse of
public opinion led to extreme distrust of government within the populace. This, on top of varying
economic pressures and increased levels of poverty within each country, primed the population
for a desire for change. The economic and social failures of each respective country contributed
greatly to the demise of old institutional politics and to the change of public opinion. Evangelical
religions rise in Latin America coincided with the demise of these former institutions. Its
reformed theology based on good works, community, and the spread of the Christian gospel
provided lower income communities with an outlet in which to achieve individual success within
the church. These combined social trends resulted in members of the Evangelical church who
were religiously active during these social, political, and economic crises to fall back on and
attach themselves with values of the Evangelical church and made them more inclined to vote
based on the religious alignments of these candidates.
The competitive relationship between the Catholic and Evangelical church also influenced the
involvement of Evangelical groups in these Brazilian and Venezuelan presidencies. The
involvement of the Catholic Church in politics in Brazil and Venezuela illustrated an increase the
likelihood of a partnership between Evangelical leadership and political candidates appealing to
religious communities. This could also reflect on a larger scale in Latin American countries that
share a Catholic religious majority and a rapidly growing Evangelical religious population.
Brazil and Venezuela, both of which have a strong Catholic presence within social and political
institutions, are more likely to involve Evangelical institutions and utilize their congregations to
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garner electoral support from the public and bolster congressional efficiency by incorporating
Evangelical leaders in legislative processes. States that have a strong Catholic majority are more
likely to attempt to minimize a religious majority’s political input by incorporating Evangelical
organizations into politics and public policy.
Both Chávez and Bolsonaro based their campaigns on establishing “a new order” that would
distance the country from their old corrupt administrations, and despite both not being part of the
Evangelical church, they both leaned into moral political issues during their campaigns such as
human rights and LGBTQ+ rights as well as utilized religious speech to dialogue with the
Evangelical population. Choosing to engage in this way further opened their supporter base and
allowed for their campaigns to succeed as they did.
The question of what the cause is for such a scenario as the 1998 election of Hugo Chávez in
Venezuela and the 2018 election Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil has been answered: the religious
rhetoric both candidates engaged in, the political appeals made by these candidates to the
Evangelical populace, the demographics and theology of the religion, as well as the sociopolitical history of each country contributing to the success of these unlikely alliances. However,
there are still several questions left because of this conclusion. To what extent church and state
remain separate in Latin America and how the electorate responds to religiosity transforming
legislation in Latin America are just some of the components that would add to the full resolution
of this puzzle. While research is being conducted on the topic of Evangelicals in Latin America,
more information regarding Evangelical growth in each respective country and the quantifying of
the demographics of Evangelicals in Latin America would be beneficial in solving the paradigm
of Evangelical influence of electoral campaigns in Latin America.
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